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Rose, LLC., v. Treasure Island, LLC., 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (Jun. 6, 2019)1 





 The Court found that (1) strict compliance with contract notice requirements is unnecessary 
if the defaulting party receives actual notice and no prejudice resulted from failure to comply 
strictly with the contract terms; and (2) a party is not necessary under NRCP 19 unless the other 




 Treasure Island and Rose entered into a ten-year lease for space inside of Treasure Island’s 
hotel/casino that was turned into a Señor Frog’s restaurant. The lease provided that Rose would be 
given ten days after receiving notice of default to cure any alleged breach of the lease. The parties 
amended the lease a number of times through mutual agreement. One such amendment at issue 
here is the fifth amendment, which provided, among other things, (1) for Señor Frog’s and its 
counsel to be included among those receiving notice under the lease; and (2) a new provision “for 
the benefit of Señor Frog’s” as a subtenant.  
 Approximately a year after the introduction of the fifth amendment, Rose failed timely to 
make its rent payment. Treasure Island sent notice about the missed payment to Rose and its 
counsel via email. When Rose failed to cure the default within ten days, Treasure Island sent a 
notice-of-termination to Rose and Señor Frog’s. Señor Frog’s counsel emailed Treasure island 
indicating that it would be unaffected by the default, effectively disclaiming any rights or causes 
of action it may have had against Treasure Island. Treasure Island sued Rose, claiming breach of 
the lease agreement and seeking declaratory relief. Rose counterclaimed, alleging breach of 
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and seeking a 
declaratory judgment. After a bench trial—during which the president of Señor Frog’s testified 
and expressed no concern at not being a party to the litigation—the district court ruled in favor of 
Treasure Island and concluded that it had properly terminated the lease. Rose appealed, arguing 
that Treasure Island’s notice of default was legally deficient for failure to strictly comply with the 
lease terms and therefore invalided the termination of the lease; and that the judgment is void 




Termination of the lease 
 
 The Court held that the termination of the lease was valid because Rose received actual 
notice of the default despite Treasure Island’s failure to strictly comply with the lease terms, and 
Rose did not suffer any prejudice as a result. In coming to this conclusion, the court briefly 
reviewed a split between jurisdictions as to whether strict compliance or substantial compliance 
with notice requirements is necessary to effectuate a valid termination of a lease. See, e.g., 
Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 471 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (App. Div. 1984); 
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contra Kimmel v. Cockrell, 317 N.E.2d 449, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974). The court found that even 
in strict-compliance jurisdictions, when the breaching party has received actual notice such that 
they suffer no prejudice by being notified in a manner other than that specified in the contract, 
“the point is to ensure that the defaulting party actually receives the information to which 
it is entitled, not to penalize the noticing party for minor technical failures that caused no 
prejudice to any other party.” 
Whether Señor Frog’s is a necessary party under NRCP 19  
Rose argues that the judgment is void because the district court and Treasure Island failed 
to join Señor Frog’s as a necessary party. Rose asserts that Señor Frog’s is a necessary party under 
NRCP 19 because it is a third-party beneficiary to the prime lease, and any termination would 
affect its rights in the sublease as well. Treasure Island responds that Rose waived its ability to 
raise this argument by failing to make it earlier in the litigation, and that in any event Señor Frog’s 
is neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary to the lease, and the declaratory judgment it seeks 
would not affect any possible claims from Señor Frog’s. 
The Court explains the two ways for a necessary party’s absence to be raised: by the alleged 
necessary party itself, or by someone other than the alleged necessary party such as the Court or 
one of the other parties. Because Señor Frog’s indicated by its counsel’s email to Treasure Island 
that it did not intend to participate in the litigation and would not be affected by it, the question 
becomes whether at this stage another party may seek reversal on the grounds that Señor Frog’s 
was not joined despite its lack of interest. This question, the Court says, has two components: 
whether Señor Frog’s absence can still be raised by an existing party at this stage in the litigation, 
and if so whether joinder of Señor Frog’s is required by NRCP 19. 
A. Whether Rose has waived its right to challenge the absence of Señor Frog’s 
The Court concludes that Rose has not waived its right to challenge the absence of Señor 
Frog’s. In general, the NRCP tracks its federal counterpart in both substance and application, with 
Nevada applying federal law when the procedural rules are similar. But with respect to NRCP 19, 
the Nevada Supreme Court does not follow federal law on the question of whether a challenge to 
the absence of a necessary party may be waived under Rule 19. 
In most federal courts, if the absence of a necessary party is not raised below it is deemed 
waived on appeal. The policy rationale for this is to avoid the tactical use of Rule 19 by a party 
who knew throughout the litigation that a party was necessary but waited until appeal to raise the 
issue in an attempt to “engineer a reversal on grounds it knew existed all along but purposely hid.” 
The Nevada Supreme Court, however, has ruled that a necessary party’s absence under NRCP 19 
may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court finds that Nevada’s policy goals are somewhat 
different, prioritizing the avoidance of “piecemeal litigation” over the potentially tactical use of 
Rule 19. Treasure Island argues that the risk of such piecemeal litigation is virtually nonexistent 
because Señor Frog’s has effectively disclaimed any interest it has in participating in this action. 
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that despite this evidence, Nevada’s interpretation of NRCP 19 
forbids the conclusion that Rose has legally waived any right to challenge the absence of Señor 
Frog’s as a necessary party. 
 B. Whether Señor Frog’s is a necessary party under NRCP 19  
Under NRCP 19, a party is necessary if the court cannot accord complete relief to the 
existing parties in its absence, or the alleged necessary party claims an interest in the litigation 
such that disposing of the case in its absence would either (1) impair its ability to protect that 
interest; or (2) subject an existing party to substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations 
because of that interest.2 The Court explains that while NRCP 19 provides for the joinder of 
necessary parties, it does not create any causes of action. Thus, for a party to be joined under NRCP 
19, it must have a claim against one of the existing parties, or one of them must have a claim 
against it. Treasure Island argues that Señor Frog’s is merely a subtenant, such that its only claims 
could be against Rose. Rose counters that in addition to being a subtenant, Señor Frog’s is a third -
party beneficiary to the principal lease, giving it claims against both Rose and Treasure Island. 
C. Whether Señor Frog’s is merely a subtenant or is also a third-party beneficiary to the 
principal lease 
The Court holds that Señor Frog’s is a not a third-party beneficiary to the principal lease 
because neither Treasure Island nor Rose signed the principal lease for the sole benefit of Señor 
Frog’s. Rose relies on language from the fifth amendment stating that the new notice provisions 
were “for the benefit” of Señor Frog’s, arguing that this language evidences a clear intention that 
Señor Frog’s be a third-party beneficiary to the principal lease. The Court rejects this argument 
finding that (1) the overall structure of the lease does not evince an intention to make Señor Frog’s 
both a subtenant under the sublease and a third-party beneficiary under the principal lease such 
that it would retain rights as a third-party beneficiary even in the event of its eviction as a subtenant; 
and (2) the notice provisions do not give Señor Frog’s any rights to cure a default by another party 
that would give rise to any independent causes of action. 
D. Whether Señor Frog’s, as a subtenant, was a necessary party 
Here the court concludes that Señor Frog’s was not a necessary party because it claimed 
no interest in the litigation, and the existing parties could be accorded complete relief on their 
claims in its absence. The court found that Señor Frog’s presence in the litigation was legally 
irrelevant to resolve either Treasure Island’s claim for declaratory judgment that termination of the 
lease was valid, or Rose’s claim praying for nullification of the lease termination. The only 
potential claims that Señor Frog’s could have would be as a subtenant against Rose, but any 
litigation thereof would not leave Rose with multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations, 
rendering Señor Frog’s an unnecessary party under NRCP 19. Furthermore, the Court found that 
if Rose was inconvenienced by any additional litigation caused by Señor Frog’s absence from this 
action, it was brought about by Rose itself—the only party against whom Señor Frog’s could have 
any claims, and thus the only party with any incentive to join Señor Frog’s in the first place. 
 
 
2  Nev. R. Civ. Pro. 19(a)(1). 
 Conclusion 
 The Court concluded that Rose was not prejudiced by any failure of Treasure Island to 
comply strictly with the notice requirements because it received actual notice, and that Señor 
Frog’s was not a necessary party under NRCP because the existing parties could obtain complete 
relief in their claims without joining Señor Frog’s. The Court therefor affirmed the district court’s 
decision. 
 
 
